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Abstract: The ﬁeld of international relations has been obsessed with democracy
and democratization and its effects on international cooperation for a long time.
More recently, research has turned its focus on how international organizations
enhance democracy. This article contributes to this debate and applies a prominent
liberal framework to study the ‘outside-in’ effects of the World Trade
Organization. The article offers a critical reading of democratization through IO
membership. It provides for an assessment of the dominant framework put
forward by Keohane et al. (2009). In doing so, it develops a set of empirical
strategies to test conjectured causal mechanisms with respect to the WTO, and
illustrates the potential application by drawing on selected empirical evidence
from trade politics. Finally, it proposes a number of analytical revisions to the
liberal framework and outlines avenues for future research.
1. Introduction
The study of international organizations (IOs) has recently turned its attention
to questions related to output, measured in terms of promotion of peace
(Pevehouse and Russett, 2006; Danilovic and Clare, 2007) compliance with
international agreements (Guzmann, 2008; Simmons, 2009), performance (Gutner
and Thompson, 2010), and promotion of democracy (Pevehouse, 2002). In
relation to the key multilateral organization that regulates trade, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), there is surprisingly little systematic work on its output and
performance (Elsig, 2010b). Most attention has been devoted to studying how
participation in the WTO and its forerunner (the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: GATT) affects trade ﬂows (Rose, 2004; Goldstein et al., 2007). In this
article, we focus on the role of theWTO in promoting democracy. At ﬁrst sight, this
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does not seem an obvious question to ask; however, considering that the WTO
represents two of the three elements of the Kantian triangle for a more peaceful
international system, it becomes intriguing to investigate WTO-induced changes to
the third element: democracy.1
Liberal international relations theory has long been obsessed with democracy
and democratization. For instance, Milner and Kubota (2005) provide statistical
evidence of a positive relationship between democratization and trade openness.
Another strand of literature has focused on how new democracies use IOs
for strategic reasons. One of the most cited arguments has been the so-called lock-in
mechanism where states join international institutions to protect domestic reforms
against modiﬁcations by future governments (see Moravcsik, 2000). While
Mansﬁeld and Pevehouse (2008) suggest that democratizing states are more
likely to join IOs that regulate economic activity than IOs that address general
political goals, most work on trade has focused on regional agreements or
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Hafner-Burton (2009) shows how PTAs
can serve as a tool to enforce international human rights. A signiﬁcant number
of contributions have focused on the ways in which the European Union has
contributed to democratization by giving access to the single market and by using
conditionality instruments to foster domestic reforms in these young democracies
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). What has been largely neglected is the role
of the WTO in promoting or sustaining democracy (but see Aaronson and
Abouharb, 2011; Comerford Cooper, 2003).
This article contributes to addressing this gap and situates itself in the literature
on outside-in effects. Three questions inform this article: First, how do we measure
democracy in the context of the WTO? Second, what are the channels of demo-
cratization? Third, what are the conditions under which democracy promotion can
be observed? In order to approach these questions we rely largely on the stimulating
work by Keohane et al. (2009). They argue that IOs ‘can contribute to the
improvement of democracy’ by three main channels, which aim at ‘combating
special interests, protecting rights, and fostering robust public deliberation’
(Keohane et al., 2009: 9). We follow their invitation that ‘an assessment of whether
any given multilateral institution enhances or degrades democracy must therefore
be based on an analysis of whether, on balance, international cooperation
improves . . . aspect of constitutional democracy . . . as compared to existing
domestic practices’ (2009: 23).
This article engages critically with the framework proposed by Keohane et al.
(thereafter KMM) and discusses the factors that affect the dependent variable
(change in democratic quality). Generally, we expect variation across types of
1 The WTO represents a prominent form of international institutionalized cooperation (ﬁrst element)
and promotes trade interdependence (second element); on the liberal triangle, see Russett and Oneal
(2001).
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regimes and variation across the three instruments described. In an attempt to
advance the analysis of how IOs enhance democracy, we suggest three speciﬁc
developments that condition the results.
First, the marginal effect of democracy promotion is directly conditioned by the
initial degree of democracy. We expect democratization effects in particular among
new democracies to occur. However, we should expect results to differ as a function
of how well liberal democratic standards are already established. Further, we do
not expect large ‘democratizing’ effects in established democracies through
participation in IOs because the marginal increase is naturally limited due to the
higher starting point. Similarly, democratization effects should be low for auto-
cracies as they lack some of the conditions for democracy promotion (e.g., existence
of civil society organizations, availability of platforms for free speech, lack of
institutional capacity to protect individual rights). Second, when relying on the
three mechanisms sketched by KMM, we need to control for canceling-out effects
when these instruments are at work. While one mechanism might yield positive
results, another might diminish democratic standards. Therefore, we need to pay
attention to interaction effects in order to come up with a judgment on overall
impact. Third, we need to be careful to disentangle the IO causes from other factors
that inﬂuence domestic democratic standards. Research design in empirical studies
needs to control for alternative sources causally affecting democracy promotion.
The article takes the form of a cautionary note. While we conceptually posit
variation of effects, empirically we expect little in the way of direct outside-in
effects. Put differently, we do not expect to ﬁnd systemic evidence that the WTO
increases democracy. Marginal effects should be mostly visible for new
democracies. In their case, acceding to the WTO treaties in 1995 or joining the
WTO after its creation is an important signaling device vis-à-vis foreign traders and
investors. The signal is intended to convince market actors that a country lives up to
internationally accepted standards, upholding the general rules of (trade) law.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the three
mechanisms of democracy promotion suggested by KMM and discuss how to
conceptualize and operationalize these mechanisms in the context of the WTO. In
section 3, we provide an argument as to the expected effects of democracy
promotion conditioned by regime type, suggest potential interaction effects, and
sketch alternative explanations. In section 4, we present some preliminary empirical
evidence to tease out our arguments. Section 5 concludes, addressing a so-called
expectation−capacity gap and suggests that future research should focus more on
the indirect effects of democracy promotion.
2. Democracy promotion and the WTO
In this article, we abstain from offering a new deﬁnition of democracy promotion
and rely largely on KMM. By democracy promotion, KMM do not simply equate
democracy with the creation of institutions to elect representative governments, but
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they in addition focus on the liberal (constitutional) character of a state by stating
that ‘the management of elections is only the beginning’ (KMM, 2009: 5).2 They
refer to institutional mechanisms that support democratic rule and limit ‘arbitrary
actions of government, which could instill fear of free expression’ by supporting the
‘rule of law, a wide variety of rights, and impartial enforcement mechanisms’. They
continue: ‘democracy requires that the powerful are held in check by the prospect
that abuses of power will be detected and publicized, which implies public access to
information. Elected representatives and other public ofﬁcials must be constrained
to defend their policy choices publicly. Deliberation helps ensure that the public can
live with political choices over the long haul’ (KMM, 2009: 6). In this sense,
democracy promotion goes beyond advocating the right to vote, and includes
various checks on legitimate (democratic) governance and supports the creation of
additional deliberation platforms.
There are various ways we could capture the causal relations between IOs and
domestic democracy. Pevehouse (2002) has focused on pressures emanating from
the IO and its members, ways in which elites are supported during the transition
process, and key constituencies (e.g., military) undergoing socialization effects
through interaction. Empirically, he focuses on regional organizations which are
different from multilateral organizations. In regional organizations there are fewer
participants, the organizations are more homogeneous, members might care more
about neighbors’ behavior, and socialization effects are more likely given the
frequency and intensity of interaction (see Checkel, 2005). Therefore, we prefer
KMM’s conceptualization, which is aimed more directly at multilateral organiz-
ations.
Below, we brieﬂy summarize their conceptualization and suggest variables to
focus on in the WTO context. The WTO as an international organization is chosen
as it signiﬁes an important departure from the old GATT system which had fewer
obligations and lacked a legalized dispute settlement system. There is consensus
that the GATT system was not characterized by ambitions towards democracy
promotion or protecting human rights (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008: 16–17).
In the WTO context, democracy promotion may be occurring for older Members
(who were already GATT signatories) as well as for newly acceding Members (that
usually follow a stringent accession process often leading to more concessions
than for existing Members). Below we discuss three channels through which
a multilateral organization can support democracy promotion as outlined by
KMM.
2 For a critique of studies relying too strongly on elections as a proxy for democracy, see Danilovic and
Clare (2007).
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2.1 Special interest groups
KMM ﬁrst suggest that IOs may help constrain special interest groups. They argue:
‘Of the numerous constitutional domains in which the interests of broad groups are
particularly apt to be overwhelmed by pressure from more powerful, self-
conscious, and concentrated special interests, trade policy is among the most
prominent. Control of minority factions is thus a central issue of trade policy’
(2009: 9). They continue: ‘Multilateral institutions such as the GATT, WTO, and
NAFTA provide mechanisms by which democratic publics can limit the inﬂuence of
minority factions by committing in advance to a set of multilateral rules and
practices that reﬂect broad public interests’ (2009: 11). They refer to three speciﬁc
mechanisms (and use examples from the WTO) that support this development:
ﬁrst, a system of reciprocity that will promote exporter coalitions to constrain
the inﬂuence of import-competing industries; second, empowering the executive
vis-à-vis the legislative which leads to more independence from special interest
groups; third, the support of a highly legalized dispute settlement system that
constrains reneging on agreed commitments.
These are all well-established arguments in the liberal school, yet some caution is
warranted. First, the causal story suffers from US centrism. Few countries foresee
an important constitutional role for national parliaments in trade policy as in the
US system; the executive branches are generally more inﬂuential in other WTO
Members (see for instance Davis (2012) on Japan). Therefore, a systematic transfer
of internal power to the executive is limited at best. Second, a point raised by
realists, a liberal reading overlooks in whose interests the rules are designed. It is
easier to delegate power to the executive with underlying expectations that rules
reﬂect the countries’ interests. Third, there are doubts about the long-term effects of
increased legalization on controlling the inﬂuence of narrowly deﬁned interest
groups. This intra-liberal criticism suggests that it is precisely the highly legalized
dispute settlement system which has empowered narrowly deﬁned import-
competing special interest groups that had been loosely organized in the past
(Goldstein and Martin, 2000).3 In any case, the KMM argument suggests that after
countries gain membership to the WTO (either as an original Member or through
accession), the inﬂuence of special interest groups is constrained to the beneﬁt of
some greater societal goals.
Empirically, we suggest focusing on two areas to analyze whether special
interest groups have been constrained: trade negotiations and implementation of
existing WTO obligations. First, when analyzing the current negotiations (Doha
Round), can we observe that issue-speciﬁc interests are counterbalanced? Second,
when we focus on implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, are special
3 Some more recent work also suggests that special exporters might be empowered (Poletti, 2011;
Poletti and DeBièvre, 2012).
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interest groups (e.g., import-competing industries) constrained in their ability to use
legal protection (e.g. trade remedies)?
2.2 Protecting rights
The second mechanism suggested by KMM is that IOs may help protect minority
rights therefore ‘rendering democratic politics more inclusive and reasonable’
(2009: 7). Various individual rights can be fostered through IO participation,
including ‘free speech, assembly and privacy, as well as freedom of press’ (2009: 7).
In addition, KMM refer to evidence from the democratization literature, that these
effects are most substantial for new democracies and states in transition. These
countries aim to protect human rights by using IOs to lock-in existing reforms. This
argument suggests two things: ﬁrst, that there were some internal reforms that led
to individual rights (before locking in) and, second, that IO participation assisted in
protecting those individual rights by building buffers against ex post domestic
reversal as a result of regime or governmental change.
If we focus on the WTO, the debate on protecting individual rights when viewed
through the lenses of democratic, human or constitutional rights is less obvious (see
Howse, 2002; Alston, 2002). Given the general objectives of the WTO as stipulated
in the treaties’ preamble, individual rights have not been top of the list. One of the
aims of the GATT/WTO system has been to raise standards of living, and trade
integration has been seen as an instrument to achieve this. Over time, the WTO
membership has paid more attention to empowering developing and least
developed countries (to address inequality among nations). In addition, in light of
the strong intergovernmental functioning of the organization, the demand for
strengthening individual rights that foster democratic standards is obviously
conditioned by governmental (in opposition to individual actor) interests.
Which rights are strengthened throughWTO participation? To some degree, one
could argue that general exporter and importer rights are improved by granting
better access to information and fair treatment in administrative procedures,
among others (Ala’i, 2009). We also witness the strengthening of general
constitutional rights, such as increased transparency, which directly proﬁt traders.
Therefore, we should observe an outside-in effect, most likely through national
courts referring to WTO law, when protecting certain rights.
It is noteworthy that on a number of occasions the criticism has been made that
some WTO rights (the right to trade which protects importers and exporters) may
have negatively impacted on other rights that reﬂect minority concerns (e.g., see
debates on whether WTO law affects the protection of cultural diversity, of the
environment, or access to medicine).4 A key platform where different rights have
clashed is in dispute settlement at the international level. Two questions arise: First,
4 See also the debate on whether the core economic rights enshrined in the WTO/GATT treaties can be
seen as human rights (Petersmann, 2002).
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what is the bias that is introduced through a selection effect as countries decide
which cases they want to bring? Second, under what conditions will the Geneva
judges set a type of precedent through legal interpretation that might spill over to
the domestic arena? Thus, in the empirical section, we will in particular address the
role of the WTO dispute system and focus on national courts as potential enforcers
of individual rights.
2.3 Public deliberation/fostering collective deliberation
The third mechanism suggested by KMM through which IOs might foster
democracy is by encouraging deliberation that is more public. The concern here,
similar to the above, is that political systems might not sufﬁciently take into account
‘information, criticism and expertise’ (2009: 8) spread across the population. This
calls for the creation of more depoliticized platforms in order to improve the quality
of information ‘on which decisions are made’ (2009: 8). The channel through
which this is to work relates for instance to ‘reporting requirements of international
treaties and organizations’. This also brings in ‘external views’, which is important
in particular in authoritarian countries. KMM continue that ‘multilateral
institutions and networks offer forums in which proposals for solutions and ‘best
practices’ can be debated’ (2009: 19).5 We surmise two types of deliberation
processes that might affect domestic democracy, one at the international level and
one at the national level. In Geneva, increased benchmarking and reporting is most
prominently done through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism (TPRM).
Every country is evaluated by the WTO Secretariat on a regular basis and a special
session is devoted to discussing the assessment report. If deliberation should occur
(with a potential outside-in effect on national discourse), then it should be
witnessed during such sessions. As to the domestic trade policy formulation, the
question is whether we witness the emergence of new consultation processes among
stakeholders orchestrated by trade ministries. While we might observe more such
platforms of deliberation, what is the deliberative character and does it affect the
overall quality? The latter question – to see whether deliberation improves
quality – is a hard test from an empirical standpoint.
3. Regime type, interaction effects, and alternative explanations
Before we discuss selected empirical evidence to address the above questions related
to the three postulated goals and channels, we refer in this section to conditioning
factors and alternative sources of democracy promotion. KMM are well aware of
conditions that affect the causal mechanisms postulated. They argue that ‘if we
have effectively made the case that multilateralism can be democracy-enhancing, it
5However, while most deliberative theorists suggest that more deliberation will translate into better
outcomes, this causal channel is not automatic (see Steenbergen et al., 2003: 22; Thompson, 2008).
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would be worthwhile to consider further empirical research to specify the
conditions under which this benign result – or the reverse –will ensue’ (2009: 23).
KMM suggest three additional speciﬁc conditions. First, KMM expect democracy
promotion to be more likely in liberal democracies that already have some well-
functioning domestic constitutional democratic procedures than for illiberal
democracies that are only deﬁned as such through electoral institutions (illiberal
democracies) or for non-democracies.6 Second, multilateral institutions that
generate and involve civil society networks and organizations can enhance
transnational discussions, creating new forms of participation that may partially
compensate for participatory forms that are lost. Third, KMM refer to some
country characteristics, namely that ‘the costs and risks of multilateralism for
democracy are likely to be somewhat different between countries that are large and
heterogeneous and those that are small and homogeneous, with participation costs
higher for the latter . . .’ (2009: 25–26). We build upon the ﬁrst conditioning factor
and draw attention to two other conditions that seem underspeciﬁed by the KMM
framework. We outline these below.
First, we assume that the pre-existing level of democracy-type standards
conditions the marginal effects that can be expected in an optimistic scenario.
This assumption is in line with much of the literature on international law and
domestic human rights, which suggests that effects are greatest for new democracies
and transition countries (Simmons, 2009). We posit as a starting point that there
needs to be some minimum level of democratic rights for the effects to occur. Thus,
we posit little direct effects on autocracies. We suggest that while potential gains are
possible, there are too many internal barriers to reform which an economic-
oriented IO cannot easily affect. Effects, however, should increase with the level of
initial degrees of democratization (transition countries, new democracies (illiberal
and liberal forms)). For established democracies, we again expect little direct
impact from IO membership. For this category, we assume a tipping point, past
which the marginal effects could decrease and could even be negative. To illustrate
this theoretical option: countries with high participatory rights may suffer
constraints in certain areas through international law. In particular, for
democracies that rely on instruments of direct democracy (e.g. referenda) or that
can be categorized as consociational or corporatist democracies (e.g., strong
participation by societal actors (e.g., in wage bargaining)), delegating powers to
IOs and their members naturally decreases input-related democratic standards as
access, inﬂuence and scope of democratically deliberated policies become more
constrained. In sum, we conjecture that democracy promotion to be most likely to
occur among less-established or newer democracies. Following KMM and
6 Liberal democracies are not only based on free and fair elections, but protect a large number of civil
and political rights. Illiberal democracies, however, do not defend classical constitutional rights, on the
term, illiberal democracy, see Zakaria (1997).
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Danilovic and Clare (2007), we suggest that newness of democracy is not to be as
important as the existence of some constitutional rights (beyond electoral
institutions). Among new democracies, ones that are more liberal should be more
susceptible to import democracy promotion than illiberal ones.
Second, while KMM refer to sometimes competing democratic values, they
abstain from explicitly addressing interaction effects. We posit a link between
protecting minority rights and constraining special interests. Providing minorities
with more rights may increase the overall quality in domestic policy formulation,
yet, potential costs emerge. We expect actors to use their newly acquired access to
pursue their individual interests (which may well stand in opposition to societal
interests). Another interaction effect may be witnessed between high legalization
and narrowly deﬁned interests groups that attempt to capture regulators. We could
conceive of a situation in which legalization leads to an increasing interest being
articulated by a protectionist group to use international law to legitimize its policies
(protectionist lock-in effect). Poletti (2011) provides empirical evidence in EU trade
policy-making of how protectionist forces strategically attempt to use IOs to get
international approval of domestic policies. We focus on this issue in the empirical
part in more detail when referring to the area of trade remedies where we suggest
that a similar development is occurring.
Third, if democracy is strengthened, the question is whether we can establish a
causal impact through WTO membership. Put differently: Is there a WTO pull-
factor at work? How can we disentangle the multiple factors that could contribute
to an increase in democratic quality? Is more domestic participation in Chilean
trade policy mainly a reaction to globalization (and a result of democratization
processes) or IO membership? And, if Slovakian ﬁrms and interest groups are more
involved in trade policy formulation, is this most likely conditioned by EU
membership which foresees stakeholder exchange in EU trade policy-making or
WTO membership? If Indian companies are more involved domestically and
internationally in policy formulation, is this a direct effect of new opportunities
induced by domestic liberal reforms in the 1980s or by WTO-derived individual
rights? The following section provides selected empirical evidence to address the
three channels of democracy promotion and discusses in more detail the
conditional factors sketched above.
4. Empirical discussion
This section illustrates our cautionary reading of the WTO’s democracy-enhancing
processes. Examples are taken from cases where we should expect such processes to
occur following a type of most-likely case design approach. If we do not ﬁnd
evidence in the context of an economic multilateral body such as the WTO, then
doubts about the validity of the conjectures made by KMM for certain types of IOs
are warranted. In the following, we do not per se make a differentiation between
newly acceding countries or original Members of the WTO. Both groups had
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accepted the WTO treaties as a single package and entered (for the most part) into
the same obligations under international trade law.7
4.1 Special interest groups
Two areas where we should witness constraining effects on speciﬁc interest groups
are negotiation and implementation. In respect to the Doha Round negotiations,
can we observe that more actors are involved in the national trade policy
formulation processes constraining special interest groups? In respect to implemen-
tation, can we observe that more societal interests are being taken into account in
implementing the WTO agreements? Existing evidence for answering the ﬁrst
question is scarce. There is anecdotal evidence that some WTO Members created
new or additional opportunities for stakeholders to engage (see Aaronson and
Abouharb, 2011; Halle and Wolfe, 2007). We witness this process for many types
of democracies (in particular established and new liberal democracies). Since the
creation of the WTO, there has generally been increasing interest in the work of the
WTO, even cotton farmers in Western Africa are today aware of the Geneva-based
institutions and they lobby their governments to take an active stance in the
negotiations (Elsig and Stucki, 2012). But, what we largely observe is that new
demands cannot automatically be equated with general support for more societal
goals, for instance Indian farmers lobby the Indian government to encourage
them to abstain from making concessions in the area of special safeguards for
agricultural imports. Therefore, what we observe is more attention and more
voices, which also implies more organizations pushing speciﬁc interests (see also
Goldstein and Martin, 2000; Poletti, 2011). Yet, there is no evidence so far
available to support the proposition that newcomers help in controlling ‘regulatory
capture’.8 The emergence of new actors primarily replaces one set of interest groups
by another or makes the ‘market place’ for lobbying more crowded.
In terms of implementation, an interesting area in which to study the
constraining effects of the WTO is the use and application of domestic anti-
dumping (AD) procedures. This instrument is used by the main trading partners in
the system. There is work that shows how WTO law can have a disciplining effect
on accepting companies’ complaints against unfair competition through dumping
(Allee, 2005). This is actually good news for overall societal interests, if countries
are taking less recourse to these measures which largely serve import-competing
industries’ interest and can easily develop into protectionist tools. However, the
story does not end here. While there might be a constraining effect for some
7Differences may exist (e.g. different obligations in areas such as services liberalization; or longer
transition periods for least-developed countries in terms of treaty implementation).
8 It is possible, under certain circumstances (e.g. strong regulatory agencies) that more voices with
opposing preferences offer governmental agencies more leeway to pursue societal interests (e.g. Elsig,
2010a on the increase of voices within the European Union after Eastern Enlargement and the effects on
agency autonomy).
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Members, data on the use of AD show some interesting patterns. Figures 1(a) and
(b) provide trends in the use of AD measures by regime type and the percentage of
AD measures that are accepted by national authorities after an investigation
process.9
The rise of AD is not surprising as it is closely related to trade ﬂows that have
increased over time (and is a result of lower tariffs agreed upon in multilateral,
regional, and bilateral negotiations, as well as unilateral liberalization). However,
what is interesting is that the use of AD by new democracies in particular has
signiﬁcantly increased, much more than its use by established democracies or
autocracies.10 Now, this could also be the price to be paid for promoting more free
trade (Milner and Kubota, 2005) as AD measures serve as additional ‘safety valves’
to buy support for more liberalization. Considering that most liberalization has
occurred regionally or bilaterally, the WTO in this sense could be seen as an
instrument that allows, within some legal boundaries, the use of protectionism-
light. What is more puzzling, is that the ratio between investigations and AD
measures has increased across all regime types, contrary to the expectations that the
WTO’s new agreements on AD were likely to lead to less acceptance by national
Figure 1. AD by regime type and ratio investigation measures
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Notes: 1 Established democracies; 2 new democracies; 3 autocracies. The ﬁrst dark grey column counts
the total number of reported AD measures (or% AD measures as a total of investigations) for the period
1980–1994, the second column (light grey) depicts the same information for 1995–2009.
Source: Bown (2010).
9 The US recorded 757 investigations from 1980 to 1994 leading to a total of 304 AD measures
(40.16%). After the WTO creation, the number of cases has declined (1995–2009) to 452 investigations,
but the relative number of AD measures accepted has slightly increased to 49.35% (total of 223 AD
measures).
10We ﬁnd only liberal new democracies in this category.
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authorities (given a more constraining effect of international trade law).11 Here the
growth for autocracies is highest, followed by new democracies.
If we focus on the prominent users of AD measures, we see substantial variation
across countries. Figures 2 (a) and (b) show cumulative applied AD measures. A
rather linear path suggests constant use of these measures. Of the established
democracies, India stands out in particular with a large increase in the use of AD
measures. With the exception of Australia, however, there seems to be no slowing
down effect to be observable after the creation of the WTO, in particular for the US
and the EU as two of the largest users. As to new democracies, data suggest high
growth rates, in particular in the case of Turkey. In the same period, only the
Philippines have observed a relative decline.12
The empirical illustrations above suggest a need for caution as to the ability to
constrain import-competing interest groups in their demand for protection. Also,
the patterns for regime type effects are ambivalent.
4.2 Protecting minority rights?
Petersmann (2002) has been the key proponent of the argument that WTO
principles, by providing for market freedoms, (should) develop into fundamental
rights with human rights character. In this respect, the WTO principles contribute
to controlling the misuse of public power (restricting individual rights) and private
power (rents from a dominant market position to the detriment of the general
public). Yet, I agree with Alston (2002) who argues that economic liberties are
hardly classical human rights instruments (and may often stand in opposition to
other constitutive rights). In this sense, he posits that ‘trade-related rights are
granted to individuals for instrumentalist reasons . . . They are empowered as
economic agents for particular purposes . . . but not as political actors in the full
sense and nor as the holders of a comprehensive and balanced set of individual
rights’ (2002: 826). There are two areas where we may ﬁnd evidence of institutions
protecting individual rights deﬁned by WTO law. Below, we focus on disputes
in the domestic court arena and within the WTO’s institutionalized dispute
settlement system. Trade law experts suggest that there is little (systematic or
anecdotal) evidence that human rights obligations have served as the driver
in interpretation of GATT/WTO rules (Howse, 2002). The ﬁrst obstacle to
democracy promotion is that WTO law generally has no direct effect, therefore
individuals cannot ask domestic courts to draw upon WTO law (Cottier and
11 There might be, however, other factors one needs to control for. Fewer cases could be brought, given
that industry has more information about the chances that their claims get accepted. Or, the AD provisions
of the WTO do leave sufﬁcient leeway for the calculation of damage.
12 For an overview of the effects of the economic and ﬁnancial crises on the use of AD, countervailing
duties and safeguards, see Bown (2011). In response to this ‘external’ shock, temporary trade barriers have
increased, in particular those imposed by emerging economies (Bown, 2011: 25–36).
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Oesch, 2001).13 In this respect, Cottier and Oesch argue that states need to ﬁnd a
balance between WTO legal effects, fostering market access rights and largely
preserving traditional constitutional allocations of power at home. It is noteworthy
that even countries with a strong ‘monist’ legal culture (e.g. Switzerland), which
attribute direct effect to many international law instruments, have been cautious
about granting the same treatment to WTO law. In the case of Switzerland, the
legislative arm did not want to allow a shift of competence or power towards the
judicial arm. Given the lack of direct application of WTO law, the potential
rightholders cannot call upon WTO-induced rights for issues that are settled in
national courts.
Protection of minorities, however, might be a by-product of WTO Members
challenging certain practices that inhibit the free ﬂow of goods, services, capital, or
ideas. Put differently, a Member, in theory, relies upon dispute settlement to protect
speciﬁc rights of its exporters and by doing so might promote speciﬁc economy-
related democratic rights in the importing country. A prominent example has been
the criticism of Chinese authorities’ censorship which inhibits rights of traders and
authors. In this respect, the US has brought two separate cases. However, the
disputants, the panels, and the AB largely evaded the sensitive issue whether
Figure 2. Total AD measures
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Notes: Total AD measures over time (accumulated numbers) for established democracies and new
democracies (the signiﬁcant users before and after creation of the WTO), including Australia (Aus),
Brazil (Bra), Canada (Can), the European Union (EU), India, the Philippines (Phil), South Korea (SK),
Turkey (Tur), United States (US). There is missing data prior to 1990 for a number of states.
Source: Bown (2010).
13 An exception is the plurilateral agreement on public procurement which foresees the possibility of
direct effect, Art. XX(2) on judicial review.
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China’s censorship had to be interpreted in relation to public morals (ICTSD,
2009; Pauwelyn, 2010). Pauwelyn observes that ‘the fact that China may . . . be
violating basic principles of freedom of speech was not even mentioned. This
approach – for which, after all, the US is as much to blame as the panel and
Appellate Body themselves – should temper the hope of those who believe that the
WTO can nudge China toward a more open society’ (Pauwelyn, 2010: 15). He
concludes that the rulings ‘may facilitate importation and distribution of material
that passes Chinese censorship, but leaves China’s substantive content review intact
and may even make it worse’ (Pauwelyn, 2010: 17). This reluctance by WTO
Members to bring cases in relation to democracy-enhancing rights issues was
further reﬂected in early 2010, when the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) consulted with Google to discuss whether to bring another case against
censorship on the Internet (Internet ﬁrewall). The USTR Ron Kirk preferred
to resolve the issue through bilateral fora such as the US−China Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) which he anticipated to be ‘much more prefer-
able than the uncertain path of what can be a two-, three-, four-year legal battle
in the WTO’ (Reuters, 2010). Lack of progress in bilateral discussions later
led the US to request consultations in October 2011, however, without any
further steps in the legal proceedings. This example illustrates the fear to
overload the existing system with cases related to human rights. The lack of
evidence either in domestic or international courts of a democracy-enhancing
process suggests caution as to the second channel of suggested ‘democratic’ outside-
in effect.
4.3 On deliberation
The third platform where we might observe democracy-enhancing processes
induced through WTO membership is related to deliberation fora. Collective
deliberation may occur at the Geneva level and at the domestic level. The primary
instrument within the WTO intended to increase deliberation is the ongoing
exercise in the assessment of national trade policy-making (the TPRM process).
The major trading nations are evaluated by the WTO Secretariat every two years,
large and middle-sized economies every four years, smaller countries every six
years. The written reports focus primarily on core trade issues; however, over time,
the Secretariat has also addressed, albeit with signiﬁcant variation in degree, the
nature of domestic trade policy formulation. These reports are discussed in a special
session chaired and run by Geneva-based ambassadors. Discussions with
ambassadors involved, however, indicate that little substantial discourse takes
place. The nature of the exchange hints at lack of signiﬁcant forms of deliberation
and rather low quality when established measures of discourse quality assessment
are applied (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Whereas the platform could be used for
deliberation, the strategic environment dictates a low degree of critical reﬂection.
Members usually abstain from openly criticizing each others’ trade policy in that
forum anticipating that when their country is under review other Members will
500 M A N F R E D E L S I G
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474561200050X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:42:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
play the same cooperative game.14 An interesting case in point is the trade policy
review conducted in respect to China in 2010, nine years after its accession. If this
forum is important for democracy promotion, we should at least witness
deliberation attempts over issues such as democratic standards. However, there
was little attention devoted to China’s democracy records. The Secretariat report
reﬂected (somewhat critically) on only one democracy-related issue: transparency.
The report stated that ‘since its previous Trade Policy Review in 2008, China has
continued to take steps to improve transparency. Nonetheless, some aspects of
China’s trade policy regime remain complex and opaque. For example, China
ranked 38th among 48 countries in the 2009 Opacity Index, which measures the
degree to which countries lack clear, accurate, easily discernible, and widely
accepted practices governing the relationships among governments, businesses, and
investors’ (WTO, 2010: 12). However, only a few representatives of WTO
Members that took the ﬂoor at the Council Meeting supported this viewpoint.15
The major concern voiced in this respect by the EU, the US, and Korea was
increasing transparency to safeguard exporters’ interests on the Chinese market,
but not directly improving individual rights for domestic traders. Other interven-
tions from diplomats representing established democracies did not address the
transparency issue (e.g., Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland).16 Another of the main
weaknesses limiting the outside-in effect is that, in most cases, senior civil servants
from the capitals are not present.17 Therefore, these reports get barely any attention
in political circles outside Geneva.
At the national level, we have witnessed various attempts to provide additional
platforms for domestic trade policy formulation to increase the base on which
decisions are taken. In the 1990s, when many new actors from the private sector
and from civil society organizations discovered the WTO, governmental agencies
started to set up additional platforms of exchange. In many countries, these
consultative processes started as a result of bilateral or regional trade talks (Capling
and Low, 2010: 8). In particular, the decision to offer new venues for interaction
was swiftly taken in established democracies (on the Canadian experience, see
Wolfe, 2007).18 For instance, in Switzerland, the competent authority set up a new
type of platform inviting 20–30 organizations to meet on a regular basis (usually
every six months) depending on the speed and progress of negotiations. However,
14One ambassador suggested that external experts should be invited to discuss the Secretariat report,
Discussion with a WTO ambassador (Bern, 5 July 2010).
15Minutes of the Trade Policy Review Body Meeting, 31 May and 2 June 2010, WT/TPR/M/230, 29
June 2010.
16 The Swedish Ambassador was the main discussant. She did not address the issue of transparency.
17 Discussion with a WTO ambassador (Bern, 5 July 2010).
18Much less is known about stakeholder participation in democratizing states (Aaronson and
Abouharb, 2011). The literature suggests that business actors have much more inﬂuence than civil society
organizations (Capling and Low, 2010: 8). However, little scholarly attention has been devoted to studying
the deliberative quality of these exchanges.
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in the end limited deliberation took place.19 In addition, participation frequently
changes over time. This change in representation negatively impacts on any
socialization effects towards more discursive and rhetorical action (Checkel, 2005).
The negotiators usually explain in general terms the development of negotiations
and use the group as a sounding board for spearheading new initiatives or to
prepare for events which will need support from the key constituencies. While
negotiators were originally skeptical about this type of exchange (e.g., important
information could leak out), they have realized that by engaging with speciﬁc
groups and selectively exchanging information, they can achieve a certain buy-in.
The experience with these types of stakeholder exchanges has been similar in the
EU context where the Commission invites and briefs various interested parties. A
representative of the business community stressed: ‘The Commission does not share
the negotiation texts, but some of the sector representatives might be shown parts
of the text (to gather support), the Commission is trying to build up a constituency,
and once you are in this process it’s hard to back track.’20 By bringing various
differing views around one table, negotiators can also showcase the difﬁcult
position they are in with regard to addressing the different concerns. Therefore,
interest groups also develop some understanding when the government is willing to
consider other concerns than their own. Thus, if there is wide disagreement among
stakeholders, this offers some ﬂexibility to negotiators in case they are called upon
by other trading partners to act in the negotiations (see also Elsig and Dupont,
2012). Yet, some empirical ﬁndings on EU trade policy formulation suggest
that civil society actors only marginally impact on the policy formulation; lobbying
is still dominated ﬁrst and foremost by business actors (see Dür and DeBièvre,
2007).
4.4 Regime effects, interaction effects and alternative explanations
The empirical discussion above suggests a need for skepticism about the
democratization channels postulated by KMM, when focusing on the WTO. Not
only are economic rights far from directly applicable, but the majority of WTO
Members have deliberately blocked all attempts to bring democratic issues to the
negotiation table, most notably initiatives by the US to address labor rights. The
other two channels (constraining special interest groups and increasing delibera-
tion) need to be assessed jointly as they signiﬁcantly interact in terms of effects.
Whereas there is certainly wide variation in participation through institutionalized
mechanisms (also for demanding protectionism), we observe few systematic effects
on democracy promotion.
From a regime perspective, the effects for established democracies and
autocracies have largely the expected magnitude (and direction). For established
19 Interview with Senior Swiss WTO Trade Negotiator, Bern, 31 October 2005.
20 Interview with representative of BusinessEurope, Brussels, 2 June 2010.
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democracies, new platforms may eventually contribute to an existing state of
saturation. There are already a number of platforms to gain access to decision-
makers and to engage in deliberation. Adding new platforms might lead to
disinterest of (formerly) active stakeholders (partial exit) and those actors with the
greatest stakes in terms of distributive outcomes are better able to cope with
multiple venues (Drezner, 2006). So, we may under certain conditions witness
negative effects on democracy promotion. The evidence presented here also
supports the expectations about little effects for autocracies. Deliberation or sector
interest constraints are less likely given the lack of democratic culture (which the
WTO taken alone cannot penetrate). However, we might witness some indirect
effects on selectively increasing access to domestic or foreign traders. As to new
democracies, we expected tangible effects (in particular for new liberal democ-
racies). Not only will new actors gain access to decision-making, they will learn to
appreciate their new potential inﬂuence (empowering effect). State authorities (and
strongly linked business interests, including state-trading enterprises), for their part,
will have to acknowledge a wider spectrum of concerns. An increase in
transparency has the potential to address the ‘secrecy’ of trade policy-making. Yet
the evidence presented above is ambiguous, suggesting little impact even for new
liberal democracies.
The interaction effects may be most signiﬁcant for new democracies. There exists
a trickle-up effect for empowering certain groups (e.g. cotton farmers in Mali and
Benin), constraining at the same time other narrow interests, and increasing overall
transparency and accountability of state actors. However, as the data from the use
of AD suggest, these economic interest groups are most likely to follow their own
special interests, limiting some of the positive results. For autocracies, effects are at
a lower level and could cancel each other out. It may well be that in China the
individual rights of traders are strengthened (e.g. access to information and due
process), but other rights (e.g. labor rights) continue to be ignored. In addition, in
autocratic states with substantial raw materials, investor rights may continue to
trump legitimate concerns for the protection of certain individual rights related to
health, water, and access to basic services. For established democracies, aggrega-
tion effects could be negative if existing strong involvement of different fractions of
society is suddenly diminished.
Are there any other outside-in effects we should control for? As we ﬁnd little
evidence of democracy-enhancing channels through the WTO, we are less
concerned with alternative explanations for democracy promotion. Whether the
WTO induces some democracy-enhancing processes remains questionable at
this stage; however, there is considerable evidence that democratizing and
transition states have joined the WTO to signal to the world that they have
moved from a state-based economic system to a market-based one and that, in the
country concerned, the rule of law is upheld, for example through non-
discrimination principles creating a level-playing ﬁeld between foreign and local
traders.
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5. Conclusions
When the WTOwas created in 1995, its designers had no intention of empowering
the new organization with instruments to induce more democracy in the
contracting parties’ polities. Therefore, if democracy promotion were to occur,
this would be more a by-product of the interpretation and implementation of the
WTO law than a result from rational design. This article has taken a cautious
approach to democratization effects through the WTO. There is little evidence of
outside-in effects up to this day. If we witness some effects, these are mostly likely to
occur in new (liberal) democracies where additional actors become empowered to
engage in the domestic trade policy formulation and where global economic
institutions help to signal lock-in internally and the existence of ‘rule of law’
externally. The discussion has also shown that we might witness negative effects,
such as the empowerment of more issue-speciﬁc interest groups or the dominance
of trade-related rights to the detriment of other legitimate principles. Speciﬁc case
studies applying the KMM framework might provide us with more country-level
information as to the conditions under which aggregate effects turn out to be
positive or negative. For example, how can underprivileged producers gain more
rights in the internal political system by drawing on WTO-related norms? In
addition, systematic studies on domestic trade policy formulation and access of
stakeholders over time might generate important empirical insights to detect
additional scope conditions of democracy promotion.
In addition, the article shows that the KMM framework is overtly optimistic
about direct democracy promotion. It creates sort of an expectation-capacity gap.
IOs, such as the WTO, are not created to promote democracy. Therefore, we need
more research to gauge the indirect effects of IO membership. While there exist
anecdotal evidence in the context of the WTO (e.g. Aaronson and Zimmerman,
2008), we lack more systematic empirical studies focusing on the causal
mechanisms of domestic transformation. How will more transparency in one area
(e.g. in the trading system providing some rights to importers and exporters)
spillover to other domains and increase in turn overall democracy? Democracy
enhancement may be a long-term process in which international institutions and
transnational organizations (business and civil society) jointly affect democracy
promotion at home. In the context of new European democracies, it has been
shown that EU membership was the prime instrument for democracy promotion
(and not the ratiﬁcation and accession to international treaties) (Milewicz and
Elsig, 2012). Therefore, a multilateral organization, such as the WTO, cannot be
expected to do all the work.
The main systemic beneﬁt viewed from a democratic perspective is situated at the
level of international cooperation. The WTO is constraining the powerful nations
and addresses states’ abuse of certain trade instruments (Grant and Keohane,
2005). However, we also observe that the way the WTO does business today
suffers from consensual procedures which in turn affect performance. Overall, the
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system has witnessed a ‘crowding’ effect (Elsig, 2011). The result is not lack of
input, expertise, and voice, but the failure to aggregate those interests. It is ironic
that many states demand more democracy from theWTO than is standard at home.
In conclusion, the WTO suffers from a democracy surplus in terms of participatory
rights to the detriment of its overall performance. The output problem is the key
issue that will need to be addressed in the years to come. Attention therefore is
currently focused more on enhancing performance than on enhancing democracy.
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